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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE A. ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KATHLEEN D. ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9396 
BRIEF OF APPE.LLANT 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING 
TO DISQUALIFY ITSELF AFTER DEFENDANT 
FILED AN AFFIDAVIT & MOTION FOR DISQUALI-
FICATION OF JUDGE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMITTED ERROR IN CONSIDERING 
THE MATTER OF REDUCTION OF SUPPORT 
MONEY WHEN THE SAME WAS NOT IN ISSUE 
AND AFTER PLAINTIFF HAD RESTED HIS CASE. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REDUCING 
THE EXISTING SUPPORT MONEY AWARD. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING 
COUNSEL FEES TO DEFENDANT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
POINT V 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PEREMPTOR-
ILY AND WITHOUT HEARING, ORDERING DE-
FENDANT TO PAY COURT COSTS THERETOFORE 
FILED IMPECUNIOUSLY. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ARGUMENT 
P was awarded a divorce from D on January 
8, 1959, (Ellett, Judge), and D was awarded $60 per 
mo. support rnoney for each of two minor children 
and possession of the family home, P to make the 
monthly payment thereon of $62.50, and child sup-
port was ordered increased $62.50 per month if the 
D remarried or vacated the~home (R32), D being 
awarded the equity in the home accrued to date of 
decree and denied alimony. P at the time of divorce 
was earning $260 net per month at the Veterans' 
Hospital (R40) and earning Army Reserve pay of $60 
per quarter (R40 & T90), owed First Prudential in 
excess of $100~ owed his Credit Union an unspeci-
fied sum, and allegedly owed his mother in excess 
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of $3300 for a Pontiac station wagon the parties pur-
chased new in 1955, furniture etc. (T90). The Court 
made no finding concerning the validity or exist-
ence of this alleged debt. 
D could not afford the utility bills to n1aintain 
the home and petitioned the Court on Feb. 20, 1959, 
for permission to move out and rent the home. 
(R 24 to 26). At the hearing on this petition on March 
23, 1959, the Court set her equity in the home at the 
first $1000 of the proceeds of the sale of said home 
and ordered P to pay $90 per mo. support per child 
if the home was sold (R37). 
P chose to buy the home and paid D $1000 for 
her equity, which $1000 he claimed he first bor-
rowed from his mother and then borrowed from 
his credit union on or about April 14 1959, to repay 
his mother. D moved out and went with the chil-
dren to Las Vbgas on April 24, 1959 (Rl04) to seek 
her former employment as a soda fountain girl at 
the Stardust Hotel. On June 1, 1959, the Court en-
tered an order that P pay the $90 bi-monthly sup-
port money to the clerk of the Court on the lOth and 
25th days of each month (R98). 
On Dec. 1, 1959, P filed a verified Motion (R60) 
·praying that D be required to show cause why she 
should not be permanently deprived of the custody 
of· the two minor children in favor of P and release 
P from making further support money payments 
(R62), and an Order to Show Cause was issued 
thereon. (R64). 
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POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO DISQUALIFY ITSELF 
AFTEFt DEFENDANT FILED AN AFFI-
DAVIT & MOTION FOR DISQUALIFI-
CATION OF JUDGE. 
On Jan. 13, 1960, D filed an Affidavit and Motion 
(R73-75) for the disqualification of the Han. Joseph 
G. Jeppson, who as ex parte Judge had set the Or-
der to Show Cause down for hearing before himself 
as trial judge. The said judge denied this motion at 
the time set for trial on Feb. 4, 1960, and proceeded 
with the trial of the issues before the court. Judge 
Jeppson at no time questioned the legal sufficienC),. 
of the affida-vit, as he might have done. 
The Court erred in not disqualifying itself. Said 
Affidavit and Motion for Disqualification was made 
under and pursuant to Rule 63(b) URCP, which 
makes no provision for the judge sought to be dis-
qualified, or for any judge, to weigh the merits of 
the affidavit. It permits the judge challenged to 
certify the affidavit to another judge solely to pass 
upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. This Judge 
.Jeppson did not do. Rule 63(b) is crystal-clear that 
the judge sought to be disqualified shall be disqual-
ified upon the filing of an affidavit for disqualifica-
tion which he does not question. This appears a 
proper and well-founded rule, for what greater proof 
of the Court's animus could be found than such 
Court's insistence on trying a challenged case. 
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By the Court's refusal to -disqualify itself, the D 
was denied a fair hearing and is entitled to a new 
trial if t"he Court herein does not restore her to her 
status quo and grant the relief she seeks herein. 
0 0 0 
Following the Court's refusal to disqualify it-
self, P put 011 evide11ce in -support a·£ his Motion to 
deprive: D of custody, which ·Motion alleged that D 
on Ju.ne 19", 1959, left the children with Mr. and Mrs. 
Ralph D. Bellamy of Henderson, Nevada, agreeing 
to -pay $120 per mo. for their care, but paid them 
only $110 from then _until Sept. 11, 1959, altho P sent 
D $180 per mo. for the children, because of which 
and other alleged elemer1ts of neglect, the children 
were taken into protective custody by the Las Vegas 
Juvenile Court on Sept. 11, 1959, (P Motion at 60-63). 
The Court duly found that P wilfully failed to 
make the support money payments as ordered 
(Rl04); that the July lOth and 25th payments· were 
ndt made until August, and the D used this money 
to -support the. children while she had them with 
her from July 25, 1959, after her d:ischarge:from the 
hospital and until Aug. 15, 1959 (Rl06), when she 
went· to ·work, prematurely and returned the chil-
dren:· ·to the Bellamys; ·that the August payments 
were made late and did not reach the D until August 
25, 1959·, at which time they were stolen thru no 
fault of D· (Rl04); that Don Sept. 11 received the $90 
Sept. lOth payment and gave Mr. Bellamy $50 of it 
on Sept. 11; that Mr. Bellamy took the money and 
then informed D the children were given . to the 
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Juvenile Court that morning (R106); that the Bellamys 
did not disclose to the Juvenile Court that the D had 
the children with her at her own expense from July 
26 to Aug. 15 or that she paid them said $50; that 
the Juvenile Court took the children, believing the 
Bellamys had not received money with which to 
feed and care for the children and being unable 
to contact the D (R106). 
When P rested his case (T84), the Court asked, 
"Mr. Clark, by way of evidence, what has she done, 
just take the children?" 
D, thru Miss Candas, answered, "Your Honor, 
we have not presented our case. I have a witness 
from the Welfare I would like to call now.'' 
Court: "I am asking Mr. Clark for a summa-
tion of what evidence he has to show the children 
ought to be taken." 
Following Mr. Clark's summation, the Court 
found (T85) that on Sept. 11, 1959, when the children 
were taken, the D was 4 $90 payments short, 2 pay-
ments being stolen and 2 payments being in the pos-
session of the P and that the payments D had re-
ceived had been paid to the Bellamys or used for 
the support of the children when D had them with 
her, whereupon the Court (T88) said P's Petition 
for change of custody was denied and the Court 
would not need any evidence (from D) on change of 
custody. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
CONSIDERING THE MATTER OF RE-
DUCTION OF SUPPORT MONEY AT 
THIS HEARING. 
Following the Court's denying of P's Petition 
for change of custody and altho P had rested his 
case (T84) and the Court had disposed of all the is-
sues presented and proved by the P, the Court at 
T87 said, "What else do you ask in your petition 
besides change of custody?" Mr. Clark took the bait 
and answered, "We ask that the support money 
payments be reduced to $100 per mo." 
The Court then erroneously permitted P to pre-
sent and seek a reduction in support money, despite 
the fact that this was not an issue before the Court, 
P in his Petition for OSC having prayed for the 
custody of the children with attendant withdrawal 
()f all support money from D and P nowhere having 
framed an issue on a proper foundation alleging 
substantial change of circumstances from the time 
o£ the making of the original support order which 
would justify a reduction. P's financial circum-
stances had theretofore been brought into the trial 
by the D solely to prove that the P was able to pay 
attorney's fees prayed and sought by the D in her 
defense of -p's Petition and in the prosecution of her 
counter-petition for P's wilful failure to make sup-
port money payments as ordered by the Court. The 
Court erred in assuming the role of P's advocate 
and instigating and permitting the raising of an is-
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sue not raised by P in his pleadings or by his evi-
dence. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
REDUCING THE EXISTING SUPPORT 
MONEY AWARD. 
The evidence clearly showed that there was 
no substantial change -of either P or D's circum-
stances from the time Judge Ellett set the original 
support money award, to justify a reduction thereof. 
Certainly there was no improvement in D's finances 
to warrant a reduction, as the Court (T93) prevented 
D from putting on . preferred evidence of her im-
pecuniosity and the reasons therefore by pro-
nouncing that the Court would find from the evi-
dence D had given that she was in need. The record 
further shows that P's financial circumstances, far 
from being worse than at the time Judge Ellett set 
the support money, were, if· anything, bettered. 
·Finding of Fact 6 (R40) of the final Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree-- of Divorce, recite: ."P is 
regularly employed by the Veterans' Hospital where 
he earns $260 net monthly. P earns additional in-
come every 3 months thru membership in the Army 
Reserve". Said Army Reserve earnings were $60 per 
quarter,· or $20 mo. (T90), and at said time of the di-
vorce, P owed First Federal in excess of $100, was 
indebted to his employees' credit union in an un-
specified amount, was allegedly indebted to his 
mother in excess of $3300, was paying $62.50 per mo. 
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on the family home, and testified at that time that 
his financial condition was 'very poor" (all at T90). 
At this hearing, P admitted that his financial 
position at the time of the divorce hearing was as 
poor as he now claimed it to be (T90). Further evi-
dence adduced was as follows: P borrowed $1000 
from his mother to buy D's equity· in the family home 
and repaid her by borrowing $1000 from his credit 
union in April 1959. He had repaid $375 of the prin-
cipal of this .loan plus interest .thereon from April 
thru December 1959, from his Army Reserve earn-
ings from July 1, 1959, to Dec. 31, 1959, being a sum-
mer camp pay in July of aproximately $185 (T44) and 
earnings averaging $100 per quarter for the quar-
ters ending Sept. 30, 1959, and Dec. 31, 1959 (T37). 
This was a substantial improvement over the $60 
per quarter reserve pay he was earning at the time 
of the divorce. His hospital pay was unchanged 
(T37). Altho he owed the credit union $625 (T42) of 
the $1000 loan, he had acquired home-equity worth 
at least. $1200 (T42). He no longer owed First Pru-
dential the $100 debt he owed at the time of the 
divorce, nor did he owe the credit union the in-
debtedness he owed at that time. And except for 
allegedly owing his mother $4000 (T40) for the same 
items for which he claimed he owed her in excess 
of $3300 at the time of the divorce, his only other 
debt was a $15 clothing bill owed to Mednick's 
IT40). 
P's house payment of $62.50 per month, includ-
ing taxes and insurance, was covered by rental in-
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come, P claiming he was able to get only $62.50 mo. 
rent from a 2-bedroom, modern home because of 
its state of disrepair when he leased it for a year to 
the first prospects who appeared. To show his im-
poverished condition and inability to pay $90 per 
child per mon.th support money, the P testified that 
he had just expended $40 on his home a.nd that after 
he rented it out in April 1959, he had repaired the 
furnace, replaced lighting fixtures, linoleum and 
bathroom fixtures and effected needed plumbing 
repairs. However, the fact that he had money for 
these improvements over and above the support 
money payments which he had discharged in full 
for the past ·year spoke eloquently of his ability to 
continue paying the same amount of support, par-
ticularly since these improvements had eliminated 
the state of disrepair of the home and paved the 
way for P to increase the rent when the lease was 
due to expire shortly after the hearing. 
On the foregoing evidence, the Court (Tl02) or-
dered the support money reduced from $90 per half-
month for the two minor children to $75 per half-
month, and at Tl03, ordered the support money cut 
to $60 per half-month whenever the children were 
not in the State (of Utah) on the due date of any in-
stalment. 
Such reduction, the defendant contends, is 
purely error, there being no substantial, or any, 
change of circumstances to warrant a reduction of 
the support money from the amount set by the Han. 
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A. H. Ellett in the original instance. And no valid 
reason, or any reaso11 whatsoever, exists to warrant 
reducing the amount of support by an additional 
$30 per month if the children reside elsewhere than 
in Utah, there being no evidence anywhere that 
the children would eat less, wear less clothing, re-
quire less medical or dental attention, get baby 
tending care cheaper, or in any way require less for 
their support, nurture and education out of the State 
of Utah than they require in the State of Utah. Both 
reductions appear clearly error. 
The fact that P's circumstances were not sub-
stantially changed for the worse, to support a re-
duction of support, was proven by P's own admis-
sions, T90: 
Miss Candas: Wasn't your financial position 
then (at time of divorce) as 
poor as you claim it is now. 
Mr. Anderson: Yes ma'am. 
Miss Candas: In other words, your financial 
ability . . . is the same as it 
was when the divorce trial 
was held; is that correct? 
Mr. Anderson: I do owe more money from the 
loans. The Credit Union is 
More. 
Miss Candas: That is because you now own 
the equity in the home the 
Court awarded to your wife; 
is that right? 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'12 
- Mr. Anderson: ·Yes ma'am. 
Miss Candas: ·Other than that, is your finan-
cial condition the same as it 
was in January 1959? 
Mr. Anderson: . Pretty close to it, yes'm. 
POINT N 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
DENYING COUNSEL FEES TO D IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE PRESENTA-
TION AND HEARING OF P'S PETITION 
AND OSC PROCEEDINGS FOR RE-
. MOV AL OF CUSTODY FROM D AND 
D'S COUNTERPETITION AND OSC 
FOR CONTEMPT OF P FOR NONPA Y-
MENT OF SUPPORT MONEY AS OR-
DERED, AND PROCEEDINGS, HEAR-
INGS AND APPEARANCES INCIDENT 
TO THE FOREGOING ISSUES. 
The D prevailed in defending and defeating 
P' s proceedings to remove custody of the children 
from herself. She prevailed on her Counterpetition 
to find P in contempt for nonpayment of support 
payments on time and for not paying a $50 attorney's 
fee awarded her a year previously, the Court find-
ing (Tl03) the P guilty of contempt of Court for not 
paying· the $50 attorney's fee and for not making 
support payments on time and fining P $25 or 5 days 
in the, county jail. Yet the Court denied D attorney'~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
fees as a matter of law, under the :mistaken assump-
tion of the_ C_ourt that a wife is entitled to attorney's 
fees··qn1y ·where··she is aWarded a divorce/ on the 
hu.sban.d's. .f~ult,·· ·and the Court therefore denied D 
attorney's fees i~ .th~se proceedings because of the 
fact that ~the original· 'clivorce herein was awarded 
to the P. 
-, i"'"·:-- ..... ~.·- ,- .. ,.,..,,, .. :· 
The Court after ·:· fnftfatihg a proceeding for P 
to seelc a reduction ·in support money after P had 
rested,, recess~d court' until 2 p.m~, arid the follow-
ing transpired (T89): · · · 
THE COURT: The only question this afternoon 
is whether the amount he is paying shall be reduced, 
and whether he should· be put· in jail for contempt. 
MISS CONDAS: . And attorneys fees on this 
hearing. 
THE COURT: On what basis would she have 
a right to ask that? ·He got·the divorce. After she lost 
the divorce case has she a right to come in for at-
torneys fees: -- -· ~ · 
· · MISS CONDAS: · Of course, when he comes in 
artd-·accuses-her and she prevails, she is entitled to 
fees. 
·.; ::·':·· ··THE .COURT: ~.You can file a brief on that. Al-
lowance of these. attorneys fees is only when she 
is ·his wife and it is his fault, and the divorce failed. 
That is not so ·in·this case. It is her fault. The Court 
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found against her. 
MISS CONDAS: That is all in the past. We 
don't make claim for that. 
(Court in recess until2 o'clock P.M.) 
At the commencement of court at 2 p.m., D's 
counsel presented Utah cases where a former wife 
was allowed attorney's fees in post-divorce hearings 
brought or defended by the former wife involving 
custody and support money matters. Unfortunately 
the reporter has not given us the benefit of a tran-
script on this portion of the trial, but the Court's 
comment to D's counsel following the presentation 
of these cases was, "Was the husband awarded the 
original divorce in the cases you have just cited?" 
Counsel answered that the Supreme Court of Utah 
in none of these cases made any mention as to who 
was originally awarded the divorce because it made 
no difference, the law being that the Court has the 
discretionary power to award the former wife at-
torney's fees in such post-divorce matters regard-
less of who was awarded the original divorce. The 
Court thereupon stated that it was not bound by the 
cases cited, there being no proof that the husband 
was originally awarded the divorce in the cases 
cited by D's counsel, and that D was denied at-
torneys fees as a matter of law. But the Court did 
not have the courage of its convictions when it came 
to signing a Finding of Fact that D was denied at-
torneys fees as a matter of law (emphasis ours). The 
Court directed Miss Candas to prepare the final Or-
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der and submit a copy to Mr. Clark two days before 
the Order was submitted for signature (Tl03). Miss 
Candas did this, the Findings of Fact reciting, among 
other things, that D was denied attorneys fees as a 
matter of law. Mr. Clark approved the entire Find-
ings, Conclusions and Decree as submitted, because 
they reflected the record accurately. But the Court, 
doubtless observing that the Findings were pre-
pared by Miss Candas with an eye to perfecting a 
record for appeal, called Mr. Clark in secretly, with-
out notice to D's counsel, and instructed Mr. Clark 
to prepare different Findings, as directed by the 
Court. The original Findings were suppressed and 
nowhere appear in the record. The Amended Find-
ings prepared under the Court's direction signifi-
cantly omit the st(itement that D was denied at-
torney's fees "as a matter of law". The Court's motive 
and animus towards D or her counsel becomes yet 
more clear by this surreptitious incident. The Court, 
however, could. not obliterate from the transcript 
its foregoing exchange with counsel which ex-
pressed the Court's thinking and ruling that the 
issue was treated and disposed of as a law question 
and not one of legal discretion (T89). 
D claims it is manifest error for the Court to 
deny D counsel fees herein as a matter of law, the 
law in this state being so well-settled and clear that 
it lies within the sound discretion of the court to 
award a former wife attorney's fees in post-divorce 
hearing of the instant type, that the writer will not 
belabor the court with a citation of the numerous 
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decisions of this ·cou"rt, arid· other: courtsj ·reiterating 
this well-settled principle of law. 
POINT V 
THE COURT .. COMMITTED ERROR IN· 
.. · PEREMPTORILY ORQERING . _D.- .TO. . .. 
.. PAY COURT. COSTS _TBERETOFORE :-.-
FILED IMPECUNIOUSLY BY D WITH-
OUT GRANTING DEFENDANT . A. 
HEARING. 
The Court, without giving D any opportunity 
to explain what disposition she. made of the $1000 
she received from P for her equity in the home or 
opportunity to justify her not having paid court costs 
theretofore filed impecuniously by her, took it upon 
itself to order her to pay the costs incurred by her 
and not paid and gave D 30 days in which to get 
them paid, as follows (Tl02): 
. THE. COURT: · The _D in this _:rp9.tter _has: some 
c6urt costs I. think· have 'not· been pai.d. She signed 
some imp~cunious . affidavit~, did she not?" • . . IT 
IS ORDERED that the D pay th~ costs that she .has-
incurre·d and has nQt paid, based on affidavits of 
impecuniosity. She receiveq_ $1000 in this matter 9-nd 
has not paid those costs. The Court requires them 
to be paid. You will be given 30 ·days in which to 
get ·them paid, and· that will be part of this order 
that the Court will expect· you to draw, Mlss 
Condas." 
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Such matter was -n6t before the Court, there 
was no evidence to justify the ~ourt finding -that 
the defendant had the ability to pay such costs or 
that she had wilfully or contemptuously failed to 
pay them, but the Court tried and sentenced her 
without any accusation, indictment or charge 
brought against her and without any hear_ing on a 
feigned charge, all of which the defendant submits 
is clearly error and gives support to the allegations 
of prejudice of this Court whom the D sought to 
disqualify for these very iniquities and inequities 
by which D could not and was not afforded a fair 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal principles herein relied upon are so 
well-established that the writer has not burdened 
the Court with the citing of the many cases in sup-
port of these principles. The points raised in this 
appeal are likewise so simple that counsel was loath 
to tax this deliberate body with primer problems. 
However, counsel has an ethical duty even to im-
pecuniotls clients and must attempt to U:i'1ravel in-
justice when it oppresses the weak and the poor. 
The cost of litigation makes justice oftentimes the 
luxury of the rich, and it becomes the. lot of lawyers, 
the first and last defenders of our freedoms, to fight 
to preserve justice in its sanctuary, the courts .. 
The record, comwencing with .the Court's ·ad-
vising counsel at2 p.rh. of December 18, 1959, that 
it was vacating its previous order ·of continuance 
and commanding counsel to be present for hearing 
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at .2:30 p.m. that day, with or without her client, un-
d_er penalty_of a $150 fine for_ contempt, shows_thru-
out. the biq.s and __ prejudtce o:f the Court to- counsel 
and D, all as more fully set forth in D's Affidavit for 
Disqualification (R73). The Court's tactical advantage 
given to the other side in deliberately reopening the 
P's case and permitting unpleadissues to be present-
ed and favorably passed·_ upon, gave -P an undue 
a-dvantage, denied. D the opportunity of a fair trial 
and militatecf to the -·detrim-ent- 'of the 'advocate 
system which is the bulwark of our~ judiciaf system. 
- -
The Court's refusal to apply the law to the facts 
as stated from P's own mouth - that P's financial 
circumstances upon- which J~dge Ellett determined 
the original -suport- money award were unchanged; 
its dismissing lightly the many cases demarcing a 
f()rmer wife's right to counsel fees in custody and 
support cases as enunciated clearly by this Court-
vividly illustrate that the Court thruout indulged its 
wont and whim, with scant attention to the law and 
substantial justice. In the only instance where· the 
Court ruled favorably to the D, P's own evidence 
plied guilt. and' .blame upon. the· p with every blow 
lie· ostensibly struck at D,- and the Court scarcely 
coulq and d1d not permit P to place his wrongdoing 
'at: D's- door. ~ , - . - . . . -- --
Other tha-n. this portion. of the decree, the re-
maining pronouncements of. the Court cannot be 
accepted' or' permitted 'to 'stand in the light of logic 
and the law. If the public is to preserve its faith in 
011r court system, if ·we are to continue to believe 
that it is the function and province and duty of our 
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courts to dispense free and dispassionate justice, 
then courts must zealously be everwatchful to do 
noting calculated or tending to impair that sanctity 
vested in our courts. 
The law is the noblest achievement of mankind. 
Courts must therefore remain above suspicion and 
reproach. To do otherwise destroys the public trust 
and destroys the factor that is the substance which 
gives validity and meaning to a system of law. 
Courts may not debase the law and reduce it from 
the level of the forum to the petty level of the market-
. place. The Court could not refuse to accede to an 
:'''affidavit challenging his impartiality because he 
thereby acknowledged to the world the presence of 
his prejudice by insisting on holding tight to the 
reins of litigation to work mischief upon the case. To 
permit such determination to stand impairs confi-
dence in the integrity of our courts, and the impreg-
nable, vaunted majesty of our courts which so proud-
ly we hail is assaulted by the countenancing of such 
a Vendetta. 
The D should be granted a new impartial trial 
unless the Court herein restores the original sup-
port award and affirms D's right to counsel fees. 
Thus only can the mischief be undone and rebuke 
and warning be sounded before the bell tolls for 
justice as we humbly believe it exists. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARY CONDAS LEHMER 
Counsel for Appellant 
410 Empire Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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